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STATE OF UTAH 
JO·HN C. DAVIS, Attorney at Law, 
for himself and all other duly 
licensed and active practicing at-
torneys and counselors · at law, 




OGDEN CITY, UTAH, a Municipal 
Corporation, and CLYDE M. WEB-
BER, Ogden City Recorder, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
May it please the Court: 
This proceeding involves the validity of a Busi-
ness License Tax (Ordinance No. 307Y of the City of 
Ogden. 
Plaintiff, an attorney at law, practicing within the 
State of Utah, for himself and all other duly licensed 
and active pTacticing attorneys and counselors at law, 
l 
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2 
similarly situated, within the State of Utah, has ap-
• 
plied for and there has issued herein out of this Court 
an Alternative Writ of Prohibition, commanding the 
City to refrain and desist from the enforcing of the 
payment of the license tax imposed by said Ordinance, 
against the plaintiff, until the further Order of this Court 
thereon and praying t~at said Writ he made permanent. 
To the petition of th·e plaintiff, defendants have 
filed a general demurrer. There i~ thereby presented to 
the Court a question of law, as to whether or not lawyers 
may he subjected to the payment of the license tax re-
quired by the Ordinance before they may lawfully engage 
in business, or in the practice of their profession, within 
the corporate limits of Ogden City. In other words 
there is presented to this Honorable Court for determin-
ation, the question of whether it is within the powers 
granted and conferred upon Cities by the Legislature, 
to pass a valid ordinance levying a r~evenue tax upon 
members of the legal profession. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 15, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of 
Ogden City, passed an Ordinance making it unlawful for 
any person to engage in business within the corporate 
limits of Ogden City, without first obtaining a Business 
License as therein provided, or to violate any provision, 
or fail to comply with all of the appropriate provisions 
thereof; and providing that any violation or failure to 
comply with any provision of said Ordinance should be 
punishable as a misdemeanor as provided by the ordi-
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nanres of Ogden City. 
The scale of ron1putation of the fees provided for 
by said Ordinance is as follows: 
Twenty (20) cents per One Thousand 
( $1,000.00) of gross receipts. 
The minimum fee shall be Five Dollars 
($5.00); the maximum fee shall be 'S~even Hun-
dred Dollars ( $700.00). 
' 
The license year under said Ordinance shall 
be the calendar year. 
The Ordinance in question contemplates the p~yment 
of an annual license fee for the privilege of doing busi-
ness within the cQrporate limits of the city and provides 
that any license fees due and unpaid under the Ordi-
nance and all penalties thereon shall constitute a debt 
to Ogden City, and shall be collected by Court p·roceed-
ings and in the same manner as any other debt in like 
amount, which remedy shall he in addition to all. other 
existing remedies. 
Business as used in the Ordinance shall include all 
activities engaged in or caused to be engaged in with 
the object of gain or economic profit, but shall not in-
clude the acts of employees rendering service to em-
ployers. 
The term doing business is defined by said Ordinance 
as follows: 
(a) Business as used in this ordinance shall 
include all activities engaged in or caused to he 
engaged in with the object of gain or econon1ic 
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profit, but shall not include the acts of employes 
rendering service to employers. 
(b) The words engaging in business as used 
herein shall specifically include, but not be limited 
to, engaging in selling any tangible property 
either at retail or wholesale, engaging in the man-
ufacture of tangible property and selling the same 
for retail, and the rendering of personal services 
for others for a consideration by persons engaged 
in any profession, trade, craft, business, occupa-
tion or other calling. -
The annual license fee exacted hy said Ordinance is 
based on ''gross. receipts''. The Ordinance expressly 
provides that only receipts from that portion of the 
business engaged in within the C?rporate limits of Ogden 
City, shall he included in gross receipts and provides 
that sales in inter-state commerce ar,e not licensed and 
are not reportable under said Ordinance. 
The O':rdinance in question was enacted for the ex-
press purpose of raising revenue with which to defray 
the mountaing costs of city government. The much need-
ed revenue is to be raised by levying a license fee or tax 
upon those engaging in business within the City limits, 
including the rendering of personal services for others 
for a consideration by persons engaged in any profes-
sion, trade, craft, business, occupation or other calling. 
This provision clearly places a part o_f the tax burden 
on those persons who receive the benefits of city gov-
ernment, but some of whom, up to now, have paid no 
part of the expense of upkeep of the City. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~) 
It is not claimed in the petition filed herein that the 
funds to be raised under the provisions of this Ordi-
nance are for other than a public purpose or that the 
City is not in dire need of the additional revenue which 
• these licenses will produce. Under. our State Constitu-
tion (Article XI, Section 5, sub. (a) and state statutes 
(Sections 15-8-39; 15-8-40; 15-8-80, Utah -Cotle ·Anno-
tated, 1943) cities such as Ogden may raise revenue by 
levying and collecting a license fee or tax on any busi-
ness within- the limit of the city, and regulate tl1e same 
by ordinance. (Sec. 15-8-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1943). 
Nearly every city has a financial crisis. Operating cos,ts 
are at a new high. Cities must cut services or ·find new 
revenue sources. Intensive studies conducted by the city 
officials of Ogden, indicated that the method employed 
by the Ordinance in question was the only method that 
would raise a sufficient amount of revenue to me,et the 
needs and requirements of the City. It would appear 
to be eminently fair and perhaps the fairest method 
that could be ~evised, of requiring every citizen engaging 
in business within the corporate limits of the city to 
pitch in and carry his share of the load of the cost of 
city government, including those engaged in the business 
of ''rendering of peronal services for others for a con-
sideration''. 
The petition filed herein attacks the validity of the 
Ordinance on six separate grounds. The six propositions 
raised and discussed by the plain tiff will be referred to 
herein in the same order as presented by the plaintiff. 
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ARGUMENT 
Under the general grant of powers to Cities of the 
State of Utah; is the following: 
15-8-80. License Fees and Taxes. 
They may rais-e revenue by levying and col-
lecting a license fee or tax on any business within 
the limits of the city, and regulate the same by 
ordinance; provided, that no Utah city or town 
shall collect a license fee or tflJ( hereunder from 
any solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains 
orders for or sells goods in such city or town 
solely for resale; and no enumeration of poweTs 
of cities contained in title 15, chapter 8, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, shall be deemed to limit 
or restrict'the general grant of authority hereby 
conferred. All such license fees and taxes shall 
be uniform in respect to the class upon which they 
are imposed. .. 
This is the statute which. now authorize's cities to 
levy tax~s for r·evenue, along with 'Section 15-8-39, (Li-
cense of Certain Business,es) Utah Code Annotated, 1943 
and other incidental statutes covering specific matters. 
The above quoted statute ( 1'5-8-80) was the authority 
relied upon by the City in drafting the license 0Tdinance 
under consideration. Therefore, the validity of the Ordi-
nance will stem from the interpretation of the above 
statute. 
PROPOSITION NO. 1 
The two cases, Ogden City vs. Boreman, 20 Utah 
98, 57 Pac. 2d 843 and Morgan :vs. Salt Lake City, 78 
Utah 403, 3 Pac. 2d 510, enter into a .quite thorough dis-
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russ1on of this statute. The legislative history of the 
statute prior to 1935 and the changes therein are clearly 
set forth in those tw'"o cases. 
It appears that the original forerunner of the above 
statute was Subdivision 87, Section 206, page 134, Re-
vised Statutes of Utah, 1898. The statute read as fol-
lows: 
The city shall have the power-
To raise revenues by levying and collecting 
a license fee or tax on any private corporation or 
business within the limits of the city, and regUlate 
the same by ordinance. All such license fees and 
taxes shall be uniform in respect to the class upon 
\vhich they are imposed. 
At the same time th·e above quoted statute was in 
force and effect, the following statute was also in force 
and effect: 
To license, tax, regulate, hawking, peddling, 
pawn-brokerage, employment agencies, the keep-
ing of ordinaries, theatrical and other exhibitions, 
shows, and amusements, and the business con-
ducted by ticket scalpers, distillers, brewers, 
money-changers, brokers, keepers of public scales, 
runner of stages, cars, public houses, or other 
persons or things,. and to revoke such lieense at 
pleasure; to license, tax, and regulate banks, bath 
houses, livery stables, skating rinks, smelters, 
crushers, express companies, restaurants, hotels, 
taverns, theatres, opera houses, music halls, 
boarding houses, eating houses, chop houses, 
laundries, barber shops, second hand or junk 
stores, and to forbid the owners or :persons in 
• 
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charge of said stores from purchasing or receiv-
ing any article whatever from minors without 
the written consent of their guardian or parents; 
to license, tax and regulate the business conducted 
by hackmen, draymen, omnibus drivers, carters, 
cabmen, porters, expressmen, watermen, and all 
other persons pursuing like occupations and to 
prescribe their compensation; to license, tax and 
regulate the business conducted by merchants, 
retailers, shop and shopkeepers, butchers, drug-
gists, photographers, assayer, confectioners, and 
fruit peddlers. 
·subdivision 38, Sec. 206, p. 129, Revised Stat-
, utes, 1898. 
In 1888, the first quoted statute, Subdivision 87, 
Section 206, page 134, was included in the compilation 
of that year. At the sam·e time, included in the compila-
tion, was a statute specifically authorizing cities to tax 
lawyers. The statute was cited as 1 Compiled Laws of 
Utah, 1888, page 3.31, Section 288. 
In 1898, when the R.evised Statutes of that year were 
enacted, the Legislature deleted the specific authoriza-
tion as to the licensing of lawyers. However, the other 
two licensing and taxing statutes were retained substan-
tially as above quoted. 
It was with this background that Ogden City at-
tempted to levy a licens~e tax upon a lawyer, based on 
the claim that the first quoted statute, Subdivision 38, 
Section 206 (the general statute) authorized such taxa-
tion. As a result of this attempt to license, the case of 
O·gden City vs. Boreman supra, came before the courts. 
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In that case the defendant, Boreman, a duly licensed 
attorney before the Supre1ne Court of the Territory was 
charged 'vith practicing law in Ogden City without a 
license as required by ordinance. The Justices court 
found him guilty. Defendant appealed to the District 
Court \Yhere he was found not guilty and discharged on 
the ground that th·e ordinance under which the defendant 
\Yas convicted was void so far as. it required a license 
from Ogden City to :practice law. 
The case was then taken to the Supreme Court to 
I 
test whet.her Ogden City had the power under the then 
existing statutes to exact a license fee from an attorney 
practicing in the City. The Supreme Court ruled that 
the City did not have such authority. The rational of 
that opinion is very important, however, in determining 
the question now presented, as we believe the case can 
be distinguished becaus·e of the rational and the legis-
lative history of the present act, since that time. 
In the Boreman case the Court held that ''where a 
part of an act has been repealed, it must, although of no 
operative force, still be taken in construing the rest. 
The propriety of comparing repealed statutes with those 
remaining in fo;rce, or subsequently enacted, for the pur-
pose of construing the latter, is not to be questioned in 
the ahs·ence of any reference to them in the statute under 
consideration.'' Continuing the Court held, ''By repeal-
ing the clause providi:qg, for licensing and taxing lawyers, 
and enacting the general clause referred to, leaving law-
yers anrl the professions generally out of such reenact-
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ment, impels the conclusion that the legislature intended 
to deprive the cities of the poweT to impose a license 
fee or tax upon lawyers that they had for.merly pos-
sessed. There must have been an object and purpose 
in this deliberate repeal in one section and omitting to 
insert its provisions in the act as reenacted, having spe-
cial refere~ce to licensi;ng and taxing in cities.. And 
when Subdivisjon 87 is considered with reference to 
Subdivision 38 and the repeal of 'Subdivision ·6 of Section 
288, it is ·evident that it was not intended that lawyers 
should be licensed or taxed under its provisions.'' 
To summarize, the Boreman case, supra, held that 
the general licensing and taxing statute must be con-
sidered in pari materia with all the other taxing and 
licensing statutes, and in view of the express legislative 
·history of licensing statutes. The legislative intent was 
found to be that lawyers shou1d not be taxed. The gen-
eral statute was held to he limited to the more· specific 
enumeration of persons and businesses that could be 
licensed. 
The case of Morgan vs. Salt Lake City discussed the 
Boreman case at considerable length an~ gave a similar 
summary of the c~se. However, that cas.e does not place 
sufficient emphasis on the fact that a prior statute au-
thorizing the taxing· of lawyers had been repealed and 
the Court was gui<Jed strongly by the legislativ~e intent 
thereby shown. The Court there again held that the, 
specific enumeration in the present S·ection 15-8-39, limit-
ed the general powers conferred by Section 15-8-80. 
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Ho,YeYer, the Morgan case did lay down a sp·ecific 
interpretation of the \Yord business as used in 'Section 
1;)-8-80. The Court there said: 
-'What ordinarily is meant by the term "bus-
iness"~ It is a pursuit or occupation. It denotes 
the employment or occupation in which a person. 
is engaged to procure a living. It is synonymous 
with calling, occupation, or trade, and is defined 
as any particular occupation or employment habit-
ually engaged in for a livelihood or gain.'' 
ilforgan vs. Salt Lake City, supra. 
With this general case law background, the ~present 
statute, Section 15-8-80 was before the legislature in 
1935. The legisl~ture at that time amended th,e statute 
to specifically override the impact of the Boreman and 
l\forgan cases, as far as requiring the reading of Section 
15-8-39, or the enumerated p~ersons and businesses to be 
taxed. The legislature in Chapter 24, .Laws of Utah, 
1935, changed the statute to read as follows: 
''They may -rais~e revenue by levying and col-
lecting a license fee or tax on any busines~s within 
the limits of the city, and regulate the same by 
ordinance; provided, that no Utah city or town 
shall collect a license fee or tax hereunder from 
any solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains 
orders for or sells goods in such city or town sole-
ly fo·r resft.le;and no enumeratvon of ·powers of 
cities contained ~.n Title 15, Cha:pte.r 8, Revised 
Statutes of Ut~ah, 1933, shall b.e deeme.d to limit 
or restrict the general grant of authority hereby 
conferred. All such license fees and taxes shall 
be uniform in respect to the classes upon which 
the~~ a f(l in1pos·erl. (Italics added.) 
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·It will be noticed that both reasons for the Boreman 
case ar.e now out of the present case. By specifically 
giving cities a general grant of power, as above set out, 
the legislature over-rides the implication that the general 
. statute shall be limited ~eith·er to the specific statute or 
to the legislative history adhered to in the Boreman case. 
It appears therefore that the question before the 
Court turns upon whether· the profession and lawyers 
in particular, come within the classification of "busi-
ness'' as defined in the Morgan case, supra. As above 
set out, the definition as given by this Court is sufficient-
ly broad to include the 'professions. Since in the ~on­
sideration .of the Morgan cas~e the Court had discussed 
the Boreman case and lawyers, it can very well be as-
sumed that if the Court considered that the word "busi-
ness'' did not embrace the professions and lawyers in 
particular, the decision would not have placed such a 
broad interpretation upon_the statute. 
I~t would s·eem that the interpretation of the statute 
by this Court would carry the most weight in construing 
this statute. However, even so, when we look to other 
states we find sufficient authority to the effect that a 
lawyer can be licensed under a general statute for li-
censing businesses. _ 
Lent vs. City of Portland, 42 Or. 488, 71 Pac. 
. Pac. 64·5, 646. 
In the case of Ex parte Galusha, 195 Pac. 406, the 
California court in construing words contained in the 
Los Angeles City Charter, ·empowering the city to li-
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cense and regulate '~any lawful business. or calling" 
held to authorize the city to tax persons practicing law, 
sinr.e the words ''Business'' and ''calling'' include per-
sons following the professions., as well as those ·engaged 
at work of a more purely commercial nature. In the 
course of the opinion the Court said (p. 407): 
'~Clearly these terms include those follow-
ing the professions as well as thos·e ~engaged in 
work of a more purely commercial nature. It is 
true that some cases seem to hold that, in dele~ 
gating the power to tax attorneys, a state must 
specifically mention th·em (St. Louis vs. Laughlin, 
49 ~Io. 559); on the other hand, it has been held 
that where a city was authorized in general words 
to tax 'all such callings, trades and employments 
as the public good may require,' a tax might be 
imposed on the occupation of attorney at law. 
(Abram vs. City of Roseburg, 55 Or. 359, 105 Pa.c. 
. 401, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 597).'' 
Continuing the Court said: 
"In the absence of constitutional or statu-
tory restrictions, there is no reason for making 
a particular exception to the legal profession, 
and where, as in the present case, the wording of 
the charter is sufficiently broad to include other 
professions in the delegation of the power to tax, 
it must be held to embrace, the legal profession.'' 
With all due resp.ect to the splendid traditions of the 
legal profession and the decisions of th·e courts with re-
spect to the power of cities to subject me.mbers of the 
profession to the p·rovisions of city ordinances levying 
taxes for revenue, we are wondering if there is not a 
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great deal to be said in favor o:f what the California 
court said in the Galusha cas·e, supra: ''In the absence 
of constitutional or statutory restrictions, there is no 
reason for making a particular exception to the legal 
profession." To the hiyman at least, it appears to be 
a work of super-arrogation, when members of the legal 
profession are heard to say and take the position that 
they are outside the pale of the p·ower to tax for revenue 
when it comes to subjecting them to the provisions of a 
city ordinance,. calculated and intended to rais,e revenue 
with which to defray the cost of city government and 
compelling members of the profession, along with others, 
to bear the~r part and portion and make their contribu-
tion thereto. 
W·e ~earnestly submit that it is the duty of this 
Honorable Court to re-examine the question, especially 
in view of the trend of modern decisions) and the con-
stantly changing conditions of society. It has become 
common-place that what may have be~en good law in 
one decade is not good law in another. 
The taxing power of a city is general and extends 
to all p·ersons, including lawyers. 
Hay vs. Leonard, 46 SE 2d 653. 
The following cases hold that lawyers can be li-
censed under the general powers conferred on cities: 
I 
In re: Kaffenbury, 101 N. Y. S. 501. Ex Parte 
Galusha, supra. 
The following cases have a bearing upon the ques-
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tion here pres·ented: 
City of Coos Bay vs. Arie No. 538 of Fraternal 
Order of Eagles et al. Supreme Court of 
O·regon, 170 Pac. 2d 389 ; Garrett Freigh!t 
Lines, Inc. vs. State Tax ComDlission et al, 
13'5 Pac. 2d 523; Hill ·et al vs. City of 
Eureka (California), 94 Pac. 2d 1025. 
In summary, therefore, it can be said . that . the 
amendment of the Utah statute in 193'5 by the legislature, 
removed the rule of both the Boreman case, supra and 
the Morgan case, supra from the picture. The gen·eral 
g·rant of authority to license, tax and regulate all busi-
nesses within the City, we believe to be the intent of the 
present law, unimpeded by the specific statute· or legisla-
tive history. We respectfully submit that the definition 
of ''business'' as laid down in the Morgan case, supra, is 
broad enough to include lawyers and 1th.e other profes-
Sions. 
All presumptions are in favor of the validity of the 
tax. 
lie. 
Hay vs. Leonard, 46 S.E 2'd 653. 
Unless the ordinance is invalid prohibition will not 
McQuillin Municipal Corporations, Section 
852, Note 55. 
PROPOSITION NO. 2 
Proposition No. 2, ''as to whether th·e practice of 
law is subject to taxation for revenue, without any at-
tempt at regulation.'' It is frankly admitted that the 
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City is not attempting to regulate the p:r;actice of law or 
attorneys, but is merely interested in raising r·evenue. 
The City by the ordinance in question, does not attempt 
to place- additional require~nents or qualifications over 
. \ 
those. set by the State of Utah. There is nothing in the 
ordinance which attempts or purports to be a regula-
tion of the practice of law. It must he regarded as a 
pure~y revenue measure as far as it effects attorneys at 
law. Under the provisions of Section 15-8-80, Utah Code 
Annotated, 19'43, the City has the power to impose li-
cense fees for revenue. Under what seems to be the great 
weight of authority, the City may levy or impose a tax 
for revenue, without attempting to regulate the activity 
upon which the revenue tax is levied. 
Ruckenbrod vs. Mullins, 102 Utah 548; 133 
Pac. 2d 325; 144 A. L. R. 839. 
All businesses may be licensed for rev·enue and the 
State Bar Act does not preclude the city from imposing 
the tax upon legal business. 
State vs. Keller, 191 So. 542.; City vs. Rail-
way, 142 Pac. 1067. 
PROPOSITION NO. 3 
Proposition No. 3, that the ordinance In question 
is discriminatory would seem to be of little merit be-
cause it merely carries out the general plan of ta;xing 
bnsinef;s, as suyh, and not the income or employee. 
The terms used in the ordinanc~ are merely de-
scriptive of what constitutes business and does not by 
its terms exem:pt any particular class of business. An em-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
ployee is not engaged in business for himself, as the 
tern1 business is commonly understood. 
The purpos·e and intent of the ordinance is to levy 
a license tax on the business. 
A tax on a business based on gross receipts does not 
apply to the employee. Therefore, the elimination of 
the employees is not a discrimination. 
Hay vs. Leonard, 46 SE 2d 653. 
PROPOSITION NO. 4 
Under this designation plaintiff says ''That the 
city is without power to levy gross income taxes upon 
its residents would seem almost to be accepted without 
argument.'' ~This p·roposition may he readily conceded. 
The objection is answered by the fact that the ordinance 
in qu~stion is not, and is not int·ended to he C?nstrued as 
an income tax. 
We £eel that there can be no reasonable doubt that 
this ordinance levies a fee for the p·rivilege of engaging 
in business, occupation, trade or profession within the 
corporate limits of Ogden City. There can be no re·ason-
able qoubt that the fee required to be paid is measured 
by Twenty (20) cents per One Thousand $·(1,000.00) 
Dollars of gross receipts, of all business, trade or pro-
fession or other activities. Th~ tax is on the business, 
occupation, trade or profession. It is absurd, therefore, 
to say that the ordinance imposes an income tax. It no 
\vhere taxes income as such. 
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COURT OF APPEAL:s. OF KENTUCKY, 
City of Louisville, et al, Appellants vs. Wil-
liam Seh:r~·~, et al., Appellees. 
. .,2 I~ s # -ZP/ .2 ¥-8 i 3 () +'" 4/ )/1 rijY()' 
This ca'Se decided by the Court of Ap,peals of Ken-
tucky on August ·6, 1948, decided and held that a Louis-
ville ordinance was not an income tax but a tax upon the 
p.rivilege of conducting a business within the city. The 
Louis.ville ordinance had many more of th,e aspects of. 
an income tax than the ordinance of Ogden City. 
All businesses may be licensed for revenue and the 
State Bar Act does not preclude the city from imposing 
the tax upon the legal business. (State vs. Keller, 191 
So. 542; City vs. Railway, 142 Pac. 1067.) Howeve:r, the 
statute under which the tax is imposed requires that the 
tax _must be uniform. Clas'Sification is permitted to 
achieve uniformity. A tax on gross receipts of all busi-
ness·es is the most uniform tax. The use of gross re-
ceipts in determining the amount of the tax is mer·ely 
incidental to the tax to ·achieve uniformity. (City vs, 
Railway, supra.) It does not convert the tax from an 
occupation tax 'to an income tax. 
·The ·power of taxation is a legislative function and 
un1e·ss restrained by the constitp.tion the power vested 
in the legislatur·e is supr;eme and not subject to review 
by the courts. A
1 
tax imposed upon occupations is not 
an income tax, but a tax on business. (Salt Lake City v. 
Christensen, 9·5 Pac. 523; Newton vs. Atchinson, l Pac. 
288.) 
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PROPOSITION NO. 5 
Proposition No. ·5 raises the question of what may 
be termed separation of powers. i-"" e. The invasion by the 
City of the Judiciary or the Judicial branch of the gov-
ernment. It is respectfully submitted that this objection 
is more artificial than real, even though an attorn·ey is 
in some respects an officer of the court. 
By the ordinance in question, the City is not at-
tempting to in any respect regulate, but only to rais-e 
revenue. Each business or activity within the corporate 
limits of the City should be required to bear its pro-
portinate or corresponding share of th~e· burden of main-
taining city government. 
PROPOSITION NO. 6 
The objection raised under Proposition No. 6 s-eems 
to be that the licensing of an attorn·ey by the City limits, 
or tends to limit, the right of clients to have an attorney 
of their uwn choosing. This contention we believe to be 
without merit in fact. 
The canon of law i. e. the right to ·engage in the 
practice bf law, has always been intended to be limited 
to the proposition that such attorney must b-e. properly 
qualified and licensed to practice within the locality. 
This very specious argument should not be ad-
vanced by plaintiff as affording a loophole or means of 
lawyers ·escaping taxation and avoiding their fair share 
of the burden of supporting and maintaining his share 
of the burden of city government, if otherwise lawfully 
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subject to that responsibility, along with other business 
men of the community. 
The ~petition filed by the plaintiff is, what may be 
termed a class suit. It does not seem that approximately 
600 lawyers practicing in the State of Utah, could pos-
sibly he affected, unless they are engaged in a general 
practice with a place of business in Ogden. 
38 Am. Jurisprudcene, Page 46, Section 355·; 
39 Am~ Jurisprudence, Page 921-2, Section 
47-49. 
We respectfully submit that the demurrer of the 
defendants to the petition filed by the plaintiff should 
he sustained and the Alte-rnative Writ of Prohibition 
heretofore issue4 by the Court in this matter should be 
vacated and set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE S. BARKER, 
City Attorney a.;nd 
A tt1orney for Defevn&antB 
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